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THE ATTITUDE OF THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE TOWARDS THE MOSCOW "DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA"

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Description

This study discusses, on the basis of the experience of the Austrian people with independence since 1918, and, by an analysis of the Moscow Declaration on Austria, the reception of the latter by the Austrian people. It then considers the feasibility of a Free Austrian Committee, and the difficulties confronting the future Military Government of Austria in awakening confidence in independence.

14 April 1944

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Summary

The paper attempts to answer the question of how the Moscow Declaration on Austria has been received by Austrians, and the extent to which it may be considereed as a stimulus to Austrian resistance. In view of the scarcity of intelligence, and in view also of the emphasis of the Declaration upon Austrian independence, an historical approach to the question is made by considering Austria's experience with independence from 1918-1938, and her experience without it since 1938. Conclusions are sought also by analyzing the terms of the Declaration itself, and the intelligence available with respect to its reception. The questions are also broached as to whether it is desirable to implement the Declaration by the formation and recognition of a Free Austrian Committee, and what will be the relationship of military government to Austrian independence? The following conclusions are reached:

1. There has not been, is not now, and will not likely ever be any Austrian nationalism comparable to the nationalism of the major European states. Austrian independence cannot therefore rest upon this basis. From 1918 to 1933 Austrian independence rested, not upon the will of the people, but upon the policy of the Allies of the First World War. The Austrians themselves preferred Anschluss with Germany. The powerful Social Democrats, and the small but influential Greater German and Landbund groups advocated Anschluss. The Christian Socials, also, the representatives of the Catholic peasant and urban middle classes were not defenders on principle of Austrian independence. Their lack of enthusiasm for Anschluss derived originally from their opposition and fear of the democratic and socialist trends they saw prevailing in Germany, trends which they were fighting at home. When

Austria was threatened by Nazism, the Christian Socials under the leadership of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg undertook to defend its independence and to promote loyalty towards it. But the totalitarian form which these men gave the state deprived it of broad popular support.

2. The Anschluss program was one of the most effective weapons used by the Nazis to prepare for the conquest of Austria. The marked improvement which the Nazis introduced into the Austrian economic situation combined, when war broke out, with the participation of the Austrian people in German victory, and in the administration and economic exploitation of German occupied Europe, served to strengthen Nazi elements within Austria and to promote tolerance for them among others. Only after the reversal of German military fortunes has anti-Nazi sentiment become dominant. There can be no doubt that at this moment a large majority of the Austrian people would like to be rid of the Nazis. This in itself strengthens the desire for independence but it is probable that it represents for the most part a desire to escape from the present dilemma of being faced with the prospect of sharing the consequences of German defeat. To the most active fighters against the Nazi regime, those too which fought underground against Austrian fascism between 1934-1938, namely, the workers in the Socialist and Communist underground, independence is not needed to guarantee their activity. They fight for the overthrow of the Nazi regime and not the reestablishment of Austrian independence. Among them are the men who opposed independence before 1933. The continued functioning of the Nazi terror system keeps their activity limited, and prevents the uncertain, confused, and morally weak spirit of independence from expressing itself. A constructive spirit for independence built

upon those Austrians who have always felt reluctant about Anschluss, and the present dominant anti-Nazi sentiment remains to be mobilized.

3. The Moscow Declaration falls therefore on none too promising ground. As in 1918 it presents Austrians with an independence about which they have many doubts. Few in Austria want a simple return to the socially and economically unstable situation before 1933, much less to the Austro-Fascism of 1933-38. The Moscow Declaration, while recognizing the existence of the problem, was unable to propose any guarantee for the safeguarding of Austrian post-war economic life. The Russian opposition to federations on her western border, and indeed to a specific Danubian federation, raises still further doubts about the future which the Nazis have been quick to point out. The promise of differential treatment conditioned by Austrian contribution to her liberation arouses still further difficulties for so long as the German terror controls remain intact. For the fight against the Nazis the Austrians need no promise of independence, whose desirability depends upon the future course of events. It is therefore difficult to see how, under these circumstances, it can be expected that the Moscow Declaration will have aroused any considerable intensification of the struggle against the Nazis in Austria.

4. It is not likely that the formation and recognition of a Free Austrian Committee would have any great influence upon this situation. The history of the many Austrian Committees already in existence in exile is not encouraging. The difficulties, in fact, of setting up such a Committee, representative of Austrians at home and abroad, are serious enough and almost prohibitive in view of the questionable

role which such a Committee could play.

5. Military government will therefore be confronted with the serious problem of mobilizing a firm and stable confidence in the viability of an independent Austria, a confidence so lacking after the First World War. Its success is likely to depend not only upon the thoroughness of its Nazi purge, and its solution of immediate problems, but upon the measures it takes, in setting up the administration of a new Austria, to assure it that the economic basis needed for Austria's existence will be forthcoming.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE TOWARDS THE MOSCOW "DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA"

I. INTRODUCTION

The publication (1 November 1943) of the Moscow Declaration on Austria raises the question of the manner in which it has been received by the Austrian people. Bound indirectly therewith is the further question of whether the United Nations should implement the Declaration by the formation of some kind of Free Austrian Committee. Were the intelligence from inside Austria abundant, reliable, and representative enough, these questions could be answered by a simple summary and analysis of it. This, unfortunately, is not the case. Inasmuch, however, as the emphasis of the Declaration is upon the future independence of Austria, it seems proper to seek an answer to the question of the manner in which the Declaration has been received by considering:

1. The experience of the Austrian people with independence from 1918 to 1938; and
2. The experience of the Austrian people as an integral part of the Third Reich.

A closer approach to the question is then sought by analyzing in the light of (1) and (2), the terms (3) of the Moscow Declaration itself, and considering, (4), the extent to which the conclusions reached under (1), (2), and (3), need to be modified by the actual intelligence available. Further, there is discussed, (5), the feasibility of setting up a new Austrian Committee, separate from those already in existence, and finally the question it put, (6), what is likely to be the attitude of Austrians towards the question of independence once the Axis has been defeated, and military government established?

In carrying through the above organization the paper

does not propose to examine the more general question of the character of the psychological warfare which might be pursued in order to wean the Austrians from the Germans, and to stimulate them to open resistance. It aims only to discuss the bearing of the particular promise of independence contained in the Moscow Declaration upon the present situation. In so doing it tries to distinguish between (1), the Austrians' desire to escape from the rigors of a Nazi Anschluss and the consequences of German defeat, and (2), their desire for independence per se; in other words, to differentiate between independence as a temporary means to escape from a dilemma, and independence as an end wholly desirable in itself. Without this distinction it argues that an accurate appreciation of the present Austrian situation cannot be made. The problem of transforming these attitudinal means into ends is not so much a problem of immediate psychological warfare as of future historical events. This problem is broached in the last section of the paper.

As a means to confirm the judgment of (1) there is appended (Appendix A): Statistics on the Strength of Austrian Political Parties from 1918 to 1933. Of possible use to those concerned with the present and future leadership of Austria is the biographical list of exile and resident Austrians (Appendix B).

II. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE WITH INDEPENDENCE FROM 1918 TO 1938

Inasmuch as the new Austrian state contemplated by the Moscow Declaration is likely to be confronted by problems similar to those faced by the Austrian republic between 1918-1938, a consideration of these is especially relevant.

Almost nothing in the history of that state lends any comfort to the hope that the Austrians would be interested in a similar independence. At the moment of the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, it was clear to almost all Austrians in a position to judge that the future of such a state was almost too hopeless to create a determined will to live. Almost unanimously therefore, they decided in their Provisional Assembly (12 November 1918) that "German Austria" was a constituent part (Bestandteil) of the German Republic. When this expressed will was thwarted by the victorious powers in the treaty of St. Germain with the prohibition of Anschluss with Germany, independence became an obligation imposed from without, and Austria a nation against her will. The following years did not convince the Austrian people that they were wrong in 1918. The dependence of a thwarted Austria upon the generosity of the Allies for her very existence did nothing to promote her self-respect. Coupled as it was with continuous economic misery, it rendered the intelligent Austrian if not more antagonistic, at least indifferent to the question of independence. With the responsibility for independence in outside hands, and with this responsibility determined not so much by Austrian needs as by the exigencies of foreign politics, neither the ward nor the guardians were interested in independence per se.[1]

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1. In the years 1919 to 1921 the provincial governments of Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and Salzburg all appealed to the Federal Government for permission to secede from the Federation. Vorarlberg wish to join the Swiss Confederation; Tyrol and Salzburg to join Germany. In the plebiscites held in Tyrol and Salzburg a large majority voted in favor of Anschluss (Salzburg 95,000 out of 102,000 voters). Schober, by offering a program of reconstruction through the League of Nations managed to avert a fresh plebiscite that was threatening from Styria (1921). The actual demands for Anschluss became somewhat less clamorous after 1921. While it was generally conceived as the solution for Austria's problems, there were always some Austrians who, while not opposing the public demands and rational arguments for Anschluss (this was after all to support the former enemies of Austria) were emotionally reluctant to accept a union with Germans whom they felt to be unlike them in speech, in manners, and to some extent in religion.

The difficulties thus imposed upon the Austrian people were exacerbated by the very nature of Austrian internal politics. For the difficult task of sustaining life, let alone making it more promising, Austria was, unfortunately, divided into two equally balanced social classes, the peasants and the urban workers, without a large and substantial middle class to act as a buffer between them. The interests of these two classes were expressed in two equally balanced political parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials. The circumstances accompanying the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy afforded the Social Democrats the opportunity of carrying through a political, social, and economic revolution of little interest to the Christian Socials when they were not violently opposed to it. By 1920 the emergency situation which had enabled the Social Democrats together with the democratic wing of the Christian Socials to cooperate in the formation of a majority in Parliament (the Nationalrat) had so far subsided as to produce a different balance of power within the Christian Social Party. Its bourgeois delegates in parliament, the representatives of large scale industry and finance, who were counter-revolutionary, sympathetic to monarchy, and shared the point of view of the upper clergy, the nobility, and certain sections of the officer corps, acquired the dominant role. Under these circumstances the Social Democrats felt obliged to withdraw from the coalition. The Christian Socials alone were unable to command a majority in parliament. The result was that they had to share power with the minor political parties, the Greater German Party and the Landbund, which thus acquired a political importance which numbers alone would have denied them.

Among these political parties there were none wholeheartedly devoted to the cause of an independent Austria. Before 1918 the Social Democrats had supported the nationalities in their revolt against the Hapsburgs. For the new Republic also they demanded the right of self-determination. Their leader Victor Adler, on 21 October 1918 took a stand for federation with Germany in case an economic federation with the other Succession States did not materialize. The Social Democrats in the Council of State had insisted that there be added to the declaration of 12 November 1918 the article which declared "German Austria" to be a constituent part of the German Republic. The first Social Democratic Foreign Secretary of the Republic, Otto Bauer, was engaged in negotiating an agreement with the Germans when confronted with the prohibition of the treaty of St. Germain at which point he resigned. Thenceforth until the threat of Hitlerism became ominous, the Social Democratic Party became the most imporant standard-bearer of the policy of Anschluss with a democratic Germany. The Geneva Protocol of October 1922 appeared to it to be not only a sacrifice of Austrian economic sovereignty to international financial capital, but with its demand from Austria "to enter into [no] obligations which would endanger her independence toward any other state" also a violation of the principle of self-determination. When Siepel asked for a ratification of the Protocol in the Nationalrat on 14 September 1922. Otto Bauer replied, "there is no polemic against high treason. It is despised as long as it is not dangerous. As soon as it becomes threatening it must be destroyed." In its Linz program (1926), at a moment when the party felt threatened by a counter-revolutionary movement aimed at the

destruction of it and its achievements, it advocated a full recognition of the right of self-determination for all nations including Austria. It added that Anschluss with Germany was to be considered as the necessary "conclusion of the National Revolution of 1918" to be achieved by peaceful means. Anschluss with a democratic Germany was one thing, however, and Anschluss with a Nazi Germany another. The threat of Nazi inroads into Austria made the Social Democrats the only possible solid support of the government against the Nazis. But by that time the Austrian government itself had become authoritarian, the Social Democrats had been pronounced illegal and forced underground, and only when it was too late to act effectively did Schuschnigg propose to the Social Democrats coming to terms against the Nazis.

It is hardly accurate simply to pronounce the Christian Socials as an anti-Anschluss party. The party had a pro-Anschluss wing led by men such as Gottfried Hugelmann, the publisher of the Deutsche Volksblatt, and vice-president of the Bundesrat, who enjoyed a strong following among certain party circles. As the dominant party in the Provisional Assembly it joined in voting the November 1918 declaration affirming Austria to be a part of Germany. In the campaign for the elections to the new Constituent Assembly it failed to include Anschluss in the party program. In the Party Program of 1926 (Article 8) the Christian Socials demanded, as the Social Democrats had demanded, that the principle of self-determination be used as a basis for relationship to the German Reich ("die Ausgestaltung des Verhältnisses zum Deutschen Reich auf Grund des Selbstbestimmungrechts"). Previously in the debates of the new Constitutional Assembly

they tolerated, without being ardently in favor of, the clause in the Constitution affirming Anschluss. But on the whole their attitude could not be described as nationalistic in any sense. It was based essentially on their anti-Socialist stand in internal politics, and therefore not on their hostility to union with Germany as such, but rather on their antagonism to union with a democratic, socialistically tinged Germany. This antagonism was supported by industrialists and financiers in their midst who were fearful of German competition, as well as by some of the clergy, and by monarchist sympathizers. In fact they were more interested in preserving the provincial loyalties and federal character of the Austrian provinces than in building up a strong, centralized, national state. Anschluss with a conservative republican Germany, or with a southern Catholic Germany they might have supported; this would have aided them in their struggle against Austrian Socialism.

It devolved upon Monsignor Seipel and Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, as leaders of the Christian Socials from 1920 to 1938, to uphold the independence demanded by the Allies, and not valued greatly by any important political group in Austria. It was their task moreover to attempt to create some kind of loyalty to the precarious state. It was Austria's misfortune that these men undertook finally to promote an Austrianism calculated to support an undemocratic, essentially authoritarian state, built upon principles of the corporative state. This they felt forced to do as leaders of an essentially conservative party strengthened by the entrance of the upper bourgeoisie of Vienna and the remaining larger towns. They felt themselves threatened by a Marxist program, particularly successful in anti-clerical Vienna, promoted by a

party which for the most part refused to assume the responsibilities of national government in the solution of the critical economic, financial, and social problems of the new small Republic. Seipel, the chairman of the Christian Social Party since 1921, the least pro-German of the pre-1934 chancellors even if he never abandoned the possibility of a German solution, founded this Austrian school. Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were his devoted disciples. As a priest he represented the interests of the Church against its opponents; as a Catholic he incorporated into his own some of Vogelsang's views with respect to the corporative organization of Christian society, views which found expression in the Papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in 1931, and in the new authoritarian and corporative constitution issued by Dollfuss in May 1934. This solution was promoted by the transformation of the political struggle between Christian Social and Social Democrats into a state of latent and then open civil war. Austria became an armed camp with the Christian Socials allied with the essentially Fascist Heimwehr and the Social Democrats relying upon their own militia, the Schutzbund. Disturbances broke out in Vienna in July 1927, and continued with isolated outbreaks until February 1934, when Dollfuss resorted to blasting the workers out of their new Vienna apartments, dissolved the party, and set up the authoritarian government subsequently outlined in the May Constitution. This semi-fascist solution to Austria's internal politics if not supported by the rightist Greater German Party, which, without any very specific program for domestic politics, held that "the principal aim of our foreign policy is the union of Germany with Austria," was supported by the agrarian rightist Landbund, which, together with the

German Nationals, held that "unification of all Germanic peoples within the German speaking territories into a unified German Reich is our fixed foreign and political aim." Thus a quasi-Fascist independence was made possible by rightists who, although supporting a decidedly pro-German course, were yet willing to postpone the Anschluss issue in accordance with the Treaties and the Geneva Protocols.

The new Christian Corporative Constitution of 1 May 1934 could not itself have possibly aroused Austrian sentiment from its pro-Anschluss bent. The inspirers of this semi-Fascist, peculiarly Catholic and monarchically flavored nationalism struck no very responsive chord in Austrian life. It obliterated all essentially democratic political life, and drove established political parties and the powerful trade unions of the workers underground. It not only intensified the hatred of urban workers against the Christian Socials, but was condemned by democratic elements in the Christian Social Party itself: the workers in the Christian trade unions and the democratic elements in the peasantry. It was only the threat of National Socialism which identified this stop-gap and somewhat alien Fascism with Austrian national interest, and aroused some fears for union with this kind of a Germany. It was the abortive Nazi putsch of July 1934 which made Dollfuss, ironically enough, the martyr of this kind of independence and lent it religious sanction. Yet only an apparent stability was introduced into the situation. In the conflict of loyalties that was precipitated, no vital support for Austrian independence could be evoked. It was too much to ask that pro-Anschluss anti-clerical democrats who had been driven underground should cooperate with the semi-Fascist

creators of a peculiarly Catholic nationalism, who accepted the dictation of Italian Fascism in the support of Austrian independence against Hitler. Since the days of Dollfuss Mussolini had supplanted France and the Little Entente. This kind of independence, accordingly, was still the ward of an alien protector, despised by many Austrians. When the time came to maintain the independence they had created and insisted upon, Austria's guardians felt unable to act.

If further proof is needed of the weakness of Austrian desires for independence before 1938, it is contained in the history of the rise of National Socialism in Austria. It was not until 1930 that, under the influences of the developments in Germany, the party reformed, after its earlier collapse, in close collaboration with the German NSDAP. Propagandists and experienced Stormtroopers were imported from Germany to guide the reorganization. The Greater German and Landbund parties were precipitated into its arms, and considerable sections of the Christian Socials went over to it. An important wing of the Heimwehren (Pfriemer Group) was Nazi. The Austrian Nazis themselves were integrated with the German Nazi party machine, and in the municipal and provincial elections of 1932 the new party at the cost of the Christian Socials secured its first electoral successes (15 out of 100 seats in the Vienna Municipal Council).

As a mass movement of variable strength, it exerted a strong magnetism upon all Austrian pro-Anschluss circles except that of the workers. Originally an urban movement which capitalized on the depressed economic situation of the lower middle classes, it spread rapidly through the countryside and gradually broke the Christian Social domination there. Its

weapons were the Anschluss issue, which, after 1932, became virtually its monopoly, the issue of anti-semitism, long a strong current in Austrian public life, the issue of anti-clericalism, effective even in the villages, and its promise of abundant jobs and of a carrière ouverte aux talents. In addition, the militant aspects and even the brutality of the Nazi movement appealed to parts of the younger generation which felt frustrated when comparing its own limited national and economic present with the promising future of a strong militarist Germany.

During the totalitarian regime of Dollfuss, the Nazis, like the Socialists, were driven underground, but, being strongly supported by German money, propaganda, and material help, and in part by aid from the Austrian Army, police, and civil service, they rather profited from this enforced illegality under an unpopular government, and fraternization with those who were similarly oppressed. A series of bomb and terror attacks, combined with sabotage and propaganda of all types, was their answer to Dollfuss' policy.

The instability of the party's mass support was clearly indicated by the complete failure of the July Putsch in 1934, after which the movement went into a sudden decline and was, for a time, threatened by inner collapse. But, unlike the Social Democrats, the Nazis could always rely on the full support of a great neighboring state. Having absorbed the minor pro-Anschluss parties and portions of the Christian Socials, it thrived on German support while its competitors were eliminated by the government, and the whole parliamentary system dissolved. Entire sections of the Heimwehr as well went over to the National Socialists. The civil service of the state was permeated with Nazis who, sensing the coming

events, hastened to align themselves in time with the victors. Nothing gave a stronger stimulus to the movement in Austria than its success in Germany. The opportunism of the small middle class which was confident of material gain through Anschluss, and the hatred of the working classes for the oppressive regime of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were heavily exploited by Nazi propaganda which pointed incessantly to the "achievements" of the Nazi revolution in the Reich, and did not scruple to promise a separate form of happiness to each of the various parts of the population.

The ultimate success of National Socialism in Austria was the result of German armed invasion rather than popular decision. But it cannot be denied that at the time of the Anschluss the Nazis could claim the support of a considerable part of the people. When the demands of Hitler became insufferable, Schuschnigg took his chance upon a plebiscite for "a free and German, independent and social, for a Christian and united Austria," which was to demonstrate to Austrians and the world at large that his government in its resistance to National Socialism was based upon a majority of the Austrian population. That Schuschnigg would undoubtedly have attained his objective may be assumed from a generalized analysis of the four principal blocs of Austrian voters in 1938:

1. Probably no more than 15 percent of the Austrian population were convinced supporters of the Schuschnigg regime. This fraction included the numerically insignificant Monarchists, Austrian Fascists (Heimwehren), functionaries of the Vaterländische Front (the single party formation set up by the government to replace the older outlawed parties), the Jewish bourgeoisie, the Austrian clergy, and some of the peasantry.

2. The workers of Austria comprised at least 30 percent of the population. Inveterate and underground opponents of the regime since 1934, they preferred at the moment the Schuschnigg to the Hitler alternative, inasmuch as Schuschnigg had finally come to the conclusion that without the tolerance of the workers his government could not be maintained, and had therefore entered into negotiations with them with a view to relaxing the oppression under which they labored, and restoring to them a definite role in Austrian political life. It is impossible to be certain about what the outcome of these last-minute negotiations would have been but it is certain that the workers would have supported Schuschnigg against Hitler.

3. Probably 25 percent of the Austrians were convinced Nazis in the sense that they were willing to give complete support to what they expected Nazism in Austria would mean.

4. The remaining 30 percent were unstable, flexible waverers distributed among all the social groups. Too timorous to vote against the status quo, and easily influenced by election propaganda, they would probably have voted for any government holding the plebiscite.

The combined votes of groups 1, 2, and 4 would have given Schuschnigg 75 percent of the votes. Yet it is impossible to argue that the results of such a plebiscite would establish either that Schuschnigg had created any vital support of a majority for his system, or that a resounding majority of the Austrian people had expressed the desire to live independently. Among the small group committed to the regime, the monarchists could consider it only as a temporary modus vivendi, and for Austrian fascists any relaxation of the measures against Social Democrats and labor unions would prove unacceptable.

For the Austrian working classes such support was conditioned by the restoration in some form of their parties and their unions. If a measure of democracy had been restored as a result, there is no reason to believe that they would have abandoned their program for Anschluss with a democratic Germany even though they had taken Anschluss out of the party platform under the threat of German fascism. The 30 percent of opportunists would have voted for Hitler, had he been conducting the plebiscite. A vote for independence under these circumstances could be interpreted only as a rejection of Hitler without abandoning the idea of Anschluss; and would have meant only a temporary and rather conditional victory for Schuschnigg.

Thus it may be concluded that the new Austrian governments of 1918-1938 were unable to rally to themselves any considerable amount of support for Austrian independence.. Before 1933 no political party outside of the Christian Socials saw any other solution for Austria's predicament than Anschluss with Germany. Before this date the Christian Socials themselves were hesitant about such a solution, less because it involved union with Germany, than because it involved union with a democratic Protestant-dominated Germany suffused with Marxism. As the chief party of the coalition governments they were obliged to identify Austrian independence with foreign tutelage. Faced with the strong opposition of the Social Democrats they felt compelled and obliged to identify Austrian independence with a special brand of Austrian Fascism. Under these circumstances the question of independence when compared with the problems of economic and social security lost any vitality it might ever have had. When Austro-Fascism was threatened by Nazism, it could find no great or loyal support from groups it had antagonized or outlawed. The promoters

of an unpopular Austrianism paved the way, in spite of themselves, for the abolition of independence the Austrians had wished for in 1918. Upon the particular auspices of this abolition, they had not calculated. Based upon the experience of 1918-1938 alone, it would be futile to expect that the Moscow Declaration would arouse anything but feelings of suspicion and even dread. A repetition of 1918-1938 is not exactly what Austria wants.

III. AUSTRIA AS A PART OF THE THIRD REICH

The probable results of Schuschnigg's proposed plebiscite forced Hitler to march into Vienna. By that very act he gained the support of group 4 above, which together with group 3, gave his regime the probable support of a small majority of the Austrian people. Important sections of group 1, especially from the clergy and the Austrian Fascist group, he could regard as sympathetic. No resolute group of Austrian martyrs arose in symbolic protest to obstruct the Nazi conquest. Instead, Schuschnigg's small league of convinced supporters together with other anti-Nazis were interned, driven into exile, deported, killed, or terrorized into submission, and the Nazis set out to convert the workers with a combination of conciliation and terror. They were not expected to become Brownshirts overnight. It was now the German task to enlarge the body of convinced Nazis, to transform the passive acceptance of the regime into an enthusiastic affirmation, to demonstrate to the Austrians that their answer to the Austrian problem, namely Anschluss, was correct, even under the Nazi circumstances which had concluded it.

It is not probable that the Nazis, without a modification of the undemocratic, inhuman, and intellectually absurd portions of their system, would in the long run have succeeded with the

Austrians. The war has precluded even a limited success. It is a question, however, whether the Nazi regime has precipitated any essential alteration in the pre-1938 attitude of the articulate Austrian towards independence, which may be described as "ultimate union with Germany, but no Hitler."

At the same time that they set out to smash the institutions of an independent Austria, the Nazis attempted to capitalize on those who did not mourn its decease, by creating conditions vindicating the character of the new settlement. The incorporation of Austria into the Reich, and the eradication of many traces of Austrian independence were swift and complete. Nazi carpet baggers from the north, to the dismay and anger of Austrian Nazis, came in to assist. Austria's nine provinces were reorganized into seven Reichs-Gaue. As if to recall the days when Austria was a mere colonial territory of the First Reich, the name Oesterreich was supplanted by Ostmark, and Ostmark then discouraged in favor of the less unified Alpen-und-Donaugaue. Austrian law was largely supplanted by German law. Austrian industry and finance were merged with the German industrial and banking systems. The Austrian system of transportation, and of social insurance, the Austrian Army, press, and cultural institutions were fused with the German. The Austrian worker was brought into the German Labor Front, Austrian Youth into the Hitler Youth, and the peasant under the control of the Reichsnährstand. An interchange of Austrian and German Party, military and civil service personnel was fostered. The Austrian Church was put in what the Nazis regarded as its proper place. Indeed by September 1939 very little remained of an independent Austria.

At the same time Austria profited almost immediately from an Anschluss with a Germany in the midst of preparations for war. Jobs soon became available for all who sought them and the old spectre of unemployment faded away. Austrian industrial equipment was in time enormously expanded, and Vienna under German control, to be sure, could envisage being raised again to its former position of prominence as a great trade and banking center for Central and Balkan Europe. Jewish business was Aryanized. German rearmament, public works, and a general rise in business activity induced a war prosperity which Austrians had not known for a generation. As Austrians were attracted to lucrative positions in Germany, and supplied with jobs in the Party heirarchy, they were given a sense of importance and prestige which they had not felt since the collapse of the monarchy. Except for anti-fascist workers and the victims of the Terror, these advantages were enough to produce a kind of temporary enthusiasm for the new regime which could create such prosperity, and open up such large vistas. At least they were willing to "wait and see." For a majority of Austrians it seemed for a time something better than anything they had experienced since 1918.

It may be that the Austrians were even less enthusiastic about Hitler's war in 1939 than were the Germans. It cannot however be doubted that, with the exception of a minority of avowed opponents of Hitlerism, they rode high on the wave of enthusiasm which followed the early conquests of the Reich. Austrians not only participated as soldiers in the Nazi conquest but they were given their share of the spoils, and formed part of the officialdom ruling the occupied territories, notably in the Balkans, Poland, and Holland. As in Germany,

there were probably some misgivings in Austria when Hitler marched against the Russians, but the Austrians did not begin seriously to question and hesitate until after America's entry into the war and the first German reverses in the East.

Thus what Austrian aspirations there were for separation from Nazi Germany were first greatly stimulated and augmented as a result of military defeats. The debacle of German arms at Stalingrad, where two entire Austrian divisions were virtually annihilated, appears to mark the point at which serious doubts for the future began to insinuate themselves into Austrian minds. Continuous German defeat brought a steady rise in Austrian casualties that multiplied the doubtings. In addition, the regimentation, restrictions, annoyances, and hardships of a war economy gradually led to the conviction that this was not what Austria had bargained for. The Reich Germans who had come into the Ostmark to take over jobs that Austrian Nazis themselves had coveted were followed by large numbers of north and western Germans evacuated from the bombed areas, with whom food and accommodations had to be shared, and who were often unappreciative of Austrian hospitality. Was it not true that Austrians were being governed and imposed upon by these boorish Prussians (Piefkes) from the north, so unlike the true Austrians? The transformation of Vienna into a city of hospitals, the influx into Austria of hundreds of thousands of foreign workers, the bombardment of Austrian cities themselves, did not allay this uneasiness. As repressive measures were intensified, and German defeat to many came to appear inevitable, as the steady demand of the Allies for unconditional surrender seemed to promise a hard peace which would not exclude the Austrians, the disassociation of Austrian from German became an imperative need, and the course of events

from 1938 on needed to be reinterpreted. Today the prevalent sentiment in Austria is one of resentment against the Germans, and hatred of the Nazis. There can be no doubt that the vast majority of Austrians by separation from Germany wish to escape their Nazi tormentors, and the consequences of the earlier folly of many of them. Only the core of convinced and fanatical Nazis remains to give the German war whole-hearted support.

It should not be assumed, however, that this prevailing sentiment is a manifestation at last of an Austrian nationalism seeking its realization in a new Austrian state, or of an ardent desire for a return to the Austria of 1918-1933, much less to that of 1934-38. The Nazi promise having turned into a frightful nightmare, this is more an attempt to escape from another dilemma, the frantic seizure of the only straw that comes to hand. The Austrians do not quite see their way out. It is in the light of considerations such as these that their reaction to the Moscow Declaration must be analyzed.

Meanwhile if the morale of the Austrian people has sunk to its lowest ebb, the mechanism of Nazi controls, and the efficiency of the Nazi terror, have kept this mood from taking any dangerous form. The machinery of terror combined with a complex and doubtful Austrian attitude, has prevented any strong underground from taking shape in Austria since 1938. But the meagre history of this underground does suggest that at least one group of Austrians did know what they wanted, and who their enemies were, and were prepared to risk their lives, not for any dubious independence, but to protect themselves against Fascism whether in its Austrian or German form. These were the workers organized in the Social Democratic, and

Communist parties and in the Trade Unions.

After their defeat in February 1934, the Social Democrats in Austria under their new name, the Revolutionary Socialists, organized a very powerful underground organization against the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime.[1] After attempts to form an organizational common front with Communists largely failed, this organization, supported by the Auslandsbüro Österreichischer Sozial-demokraten at Brünn, stretched throughout Austria with a Zentralkomitee working through five Kreisleiter and twenty-one Bezirksleiter in Vienna, and corresponding Kreisleiter and Ortsleiter for the rest of Austria. It had an active and influential underground press, its own Youth Organization with its own press, special shock troops to help distribute pamphlets, and the Sozialistische Arbeiterhilfe which worked with the families of political prisoners. After their dissolution on 29 May 1933 by Dollfuss, the Communists, of no political importance up to this date, went underground. The defeat of the Social Democrats in February 1934 enabled them to attract some Social Democrats to their underground, and they absorbed some of the smaller cells as well. Until the Social Democrats recovered the Communist underground was thus paramount. In addition to the Socialist and Communist undergrounds there was also during this period an illegal trade union movement. The government had attempted, after crushing the free trade union organizations, to organize an equivalent of the German DAF in the Einheitsgewerkschaft (E.G.) in which the Christian trade unions and the Heimwehr played the dominant role. Both Social Democrats and Communists cooperated in the organization

1. Its history is contained in Otto Bauer's Die Illegale Partei, Paris, 1939.

of the illegal trade union movement which had its own press. Ultimately, however, it was forced to confine itself to working within the frame work of the E.G. upon which, by the end of the Schuschnigg regime, it exercised a great influence. Thus it may be said that from 1934 to 1938, Austrian labor, unlike German labor, preserved its party and trade union organizations underground.

The powerful underground organization of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg period was broken but not destroyed by the terrorism that followed the Anschluss. It preserved its general character as a labor underground composed chiefly of Socialist, Communist, and trade unionists. From the evidence available, it may be assumed that the Communist underground, if not in numbers, at least in activity, is strongest. The Revolutionary Socialists probably have cells well scattered in Vienna and the chief Austrian cities, which employ several hundred men and women workers. But they engage in no activities endangering their existence, and aim merely to keep their organization alive ready to act when the collapse comes.[1] The Communists have been especially strong in the outlying industrial districts near Vienna (e.g., Wiener Neustadt),[2] and have made an especial appeal to youth (Kommunistischer Jugendverband). The influence of the Russian advance may be assumed to have contributed to its growing strength. It has been active also in promoting a common front organization in which some former Christian Socials and monarchist personalities, as well as some Revolutionary Socialists have cooperated. This is in line with now well-established Soviet policy. There can be no doubt either that remnants of the former strong trade

1. CID #18364.
2. L. 10505.

union underground are still active. Indeed its membership in 1942 was estimated at 5-6,000, with 60 percent of this number in Vienna, and others in Styria and Linz.[1] The character of the German Terror is such that the activities of these labor undergrounds have been largely confined to preparing for the day when military defeat will have brought about a collapse of Nazi rule. Yet, when possible, they have written inscriptions, distributed handbills and pamphlets, and promoted passive resistance, strikes and sabotage to a limited extent in the factories. Outside these labor groups there is scant evidence, and that needing confirmation, of illegal cells in non-political freedom organizations, and in Catholic journeymen and monarchist circles. But when compared with the resistance movements in other occupied nations, the Austrian, having no strong nationalism as its basic drive, is weak, and depends rather upon anti-Nazi sentiment than upon strong hope and confidence in the future of Austria. Nor does it seem possible to argue that the comparatively stronger German controls in Austria are responsible for this. Groups which have been most persistent in their demands for union with a democratic Germany have constituted underground resistance to the Nazis. This is the kind of mood calculated, under proper circumstances to precipitate civil war rather than to commence a struggle for national independence.

It may be concluded, therefore, that the Nazi regime has brought about no basic alteration in the pre-1938 attitude of Austrians towards independence, described as "ultimate union with Germany but no Hitler." This is not to say, however,

1. CID #27675.

that the experience with the Nazis has not raised doubts about the possibility of ever coming to terms with the Germans or confirmed the feelings of those who have always felt emotionally indisposed to consider Anschluss seriously. The present sentiment for separation from Germany is not the expression of Austrian national desire for independence but rather of Austrian attempts to escape a bad situation. The Austrian support of the Nazi regime in its early days was that of a numerical majority within which there was considerable enthusiasm. And this enthusiasm began to waver only when it became clear that Austria as a part of Germany might suffer as well as profit from the aggrandizement of war, when, that is, the war threatened to end in disaster. The only escape from the penalties of defeat was disassociation from the German cause, whose only practical form seemed to be the restoration of independence. It is conceivable that under any circumstances other than military defeat a majority of the Austrians might not be regretting their lost liberties. A virile nation proud of its independence does not, whatever the cost, knuckle under so completely as the Austrians have done. Insofar as is known the majority were largely content while things were going well. Those who had lost all or who were threatened with the loss of all continued to resist the Germans as they had resisted the Austrian Fascists, and among them, it may be repeated, are those who have never been interested in independence.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MOSCOW "DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA"

The text of the Moscow "Declaration on Austria" reads:

"The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

"They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on 15 March 1938 as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring States which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

"Austria is reminded however, that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation."

The Declaration thus contains:

1. An affirmation of the Allies' intention of restoring the independence of Austria.[1]

2. An expression of the Allies' view that a free and independent Austria will be able to solve her political and economic problems in collaboration with those neighboring states which are confronted with similar problems.

3. A limiting clause to the effect that Austria will have to bear her share of the German war guilt.

4. A warning that Austria's post-war fate will depend upon her own contribution to her liberation.

In estimating the effect of these four points on the people of Austria, it is necessary to consider with respect to

(1) that the Declaration states that it has been decided to separate Austria from Germany. Austria's independence is thus decreed, rather than promised. Whatever may happen during the coming months, whatever the Austrian

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1. In his speech to Congress (18 November 1943) Secretary Hull paraphrases the Declaration as follows: "In a declaration on Austria the forcible annexation of that unhappy country was pronounced null and void. It was further declared that Austria is to be given an opportunity to become reestablished as a free and independent state, although the Austrians were put on notice that in the final analysis the treatment to be accorded them will depend upon the contribution which they will make toward the defeat of Germany and the liberation of their country." Does Secretary Hull wish to suggest that American policy is to allow Austria to decide her own fate?

people may desire and whatever action it may take, the Declaration implies that the independence of Austria will be an inevitable consequence of the Allied victory. Thus Austrian independence is once again the result of a decision of external powers and not of the Austrian people themselves. They have been deprived of the satisfaction of making their own decision on this point, and the issue of independence has been removed from the realm of discussion. Sentiment in favor of independence among the Austrian people is accordingly of importance only insofar as it may lead to anti-Nazi activity and thus to a more lenient consideration by the Allies of Austria's war-guilt. The Declaration thus takes the form of another prohibition of Anschluss as contained in the treaty of St. Germain, and takes for granted, rather than attempting to foster, the Austrian desire for independence. It may thus be said to be based upon a misinterpretation of certain phases of Austrian history.

The Declaration then states (2) in a somewhat guarded manner that the political and economic problems of the future Austrian state will be capable of solution by an independent Austria co-operating with her neighbouring states. This, it must be noted, does not constitute a positive program for an economic and political reconstruction of Austria but appears, rather, an indefinite acknowledgement of the fact that the crucial problem of Austrian independence remains the establishment of a viable economic and political state structure. This is made the responsibility of the Austrian people themselves in cooperation with neighbouring states.

Perhaps because of its necessary vagueness, this very point of the Declaration called forth an elaborate Russian

comment. An article in the twelfth issue of War and the Working Class categorically vetoes any plan for a "Danubian Federation" as hostile to the Soviet Union. It was inevitable that this article received almost as much publicity in the Austrian press as the Declaration itself.[1]

The effect on the Austrian people of this part of the Declaration is likely to be one of disappointment. The lack of a concrete plan or guarantee of any assistance, and the evidence that perfect agreement on this vital point may not exist among the Allies, is bound to make a deep impression. It arouses all the unpleasant memories of the First Republic.

The experience of the period of 1918-1938 is still too vivid to let the Austrian people forget that independence alone will not solve Austria's problems.[2] The failure of the Austrian Republic to achieve a closer economic and political cooperation with the Succession States and, in particular, her failure to break through the economic barriers with which her neighbours surrounded her has not been forgotten by the people which suffered the inevitable consequences of this isolation. The experience of the first post-war period demonstrates that Austria must seek union with a larger economic area. She is therefore confronted with the choice between a union with Germany, or a union with the Danubian states, or of becoming again a ward of the powers. That a Danubian solution cannot be achieved without the active help of the Allied Powers appears certain. In the absence of a strong popular desire for independence at any price, the liberation of Austria

1. Neues Wiener Tageblatt, 28 November 1943; Oberdonauzeitung, 3 December 1943; Salzachzeitung, 27 November 1943.
2. The Nazi press has commented: "It is amazing that the Vansittart-Frankensteins believe that the workers of this once small country have forgotten the days of unemployment and are longing for a split-up state."

from Germany will appear to the people as a lasting gain only if a concrete and practicable alternative solution of Austria's problems is formulated by the Allies. Such a formulation is not contained in the Declaration and the Russian attitude, expressed in War and the Working Class, suggests that the Allies have been unable to agree on any definite formulation. The Nazi press has exploited this situation[1] by intimating (a), that the Allies merely wish to create a weak and harmless Austria, and (b), that Stalin has his own intentions regarding Austria's future. Austrians are thus confronted with a repetition of their earlier difficulties, to be endured for an independence they have had no voice in securing.

The Moscow Declaration then makes it clear (3-4) that the people of Austria must contribute to their liberation from Germany, and warns them that the degree of leniency which they may expect from the Allies will be proportionate to their own contribution to the liberation of their country. As an incitement to engage in anti-German action this is almost a command and a threat. It raises the question of whether the Austrians under all these circumstances are ready and willing to incur the risks and sacrifices attendant upon open resistance to the Nazis.

From what has been said in previous sections, it is possible to distinguish two principal incentives for anti-German action:

(a) The desire to be free from German Fascism can be assumed to prevail among Austrians of all classes and among

1. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 November 1943 (News Digest #1284). "Everybody who is acquainted with the usual phrases of the enemy realizes what the Moscow Conference had in mind: the creation of an economically weak and therefore perfectly safe Austria." Tagespost, Graz, 5 November 1943.

the remnants of all the former party groups. It must be noted again, however, that in the form of independence such a desire does not have the same force in Austria as in Poland or Czechoslovakia and other occupied countries, where nationalism is the product of centuries. It is doubtful whether many Austrians would sacrifice their lives in the cause of Austrian independence, but they do risk their lives to oppose the viciousness of the Nazi system. This is an opposition of a moral kind antecedent to the Moscow Declaration. Thus it is quite conceivable that many of those who today advocate liberation from Nazi Germany will not be opposed in principle to a future union with a democratic German republic. The undoubtedly increased desire for independence is thus the most expedient form of expressing one's hatred for Nazism.

The traditional dislike of Prussianized North Germans has undoubtedly increased in Austria, and among Austrians in the German armies. It would be a mistake, however, to over-estimate the effects of this dislike. There is every indication that the much vaunted Austrian "hatred" for the Germans is largely confined to grumbling and complaining and that it need not lead to serious altercations.

It also appears that the Austrians take their liberation from Germany for granted as an inevitable outcome of the war. Thus, of a group of Austrian prisoners of war recently questioned, none had ever heard of the Moscow Declaration, but all were convinced that the Allies would separate Austria from Germany after the war, perhaps as a form of punishment.[1] The formulation of the issue of Austrian independence in the Moscow Declaration does not tend to disturb this rather matter-of-fact

1. Prisoner of War Interrogations, OSS, CID, 54292 and 54294.

attitude.

(b) The desire to escape the consequences of the German defeat. This is the soft spot in Austrian morale at which the Declaration was chiefly aimed. It is significant that the Austrian Nazi press has repeatedly pointed out the lesson of Italy's surrender as a warning to those who might toy with the idea of a separate peace for Austria.[1] It has also been noticeable that Austrian soldiers surrender more readily than German soldiers, but not so much from political reasons as from general war weariness and partly perhaps because of rumors, current in Austria, that Austrian prisoners of war receive better treatment than their German comrades.[2]

That in spite of these incentives Austrian resistance is still fairly insignificant is mainly due to

(a) the effective use of terror methods by the Nazi authorities,

(b) the drain on Austrian manpower caused by military conscription which has removed the majority of young, able-bodied Austrians from their homes and placed them in surroundings in which active resistance is extremely difficult,

(c) the reluctance of the majority of the population to take violent action against the Nazis. The conditions producing a "low"morale are not sufficient to stimulate revolt even if revolt were possible. The Austrian people people still does not see a way out of its predicament.

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1. Salzburger Zeitung, 10 November 1943: "What capitulation means has been shown by the example of Badoglio Italy which now has war on its own soil, twice the number of air-raids and half the food rations."
2. Tagespost, Graz, 17 November 1943, (News Digest #1304).

The incentives which the Moscow Declaration offers are too vague and

(d) the intentions of the Allies are too suspect. Nazi propaganda, pointing to the "lesson of President Wilson's unfulfilled promises," strives to destroy whatever confidence in the sincerity of the Declaration might exist among Austrians[1] and to create

(e) the fear of a sovietization of Austria by hinting that the Americans and the British have "sold out" to the Russians.[2]

The effect of the Declaration is further limited by its emphasis on Austria's share of the war guilt. This part of the Declaration has provoked protests on the part of Austrian exiles,[3] who maintain that Austria was annexed by Germany in 1938, that it has had no freedom of decision since the Anschluss and should not receive a more severe treatment than Denmark, Czechoslovakia, and other occupied countries in which there has also been evidence of collaboration with the Nazis. In Austria, on the other hand, the Nazis seek to create the impression that the Allies do not actually discriminate between Austrians and Germans except in theory. The bombing of Innsbruck provoked Nazi propaganda comments[4] to the effect that the Allies do not hesitate to direct their "air-terror" against Germans and Austrians alike, and distinguish between Austrians and Germans only in the interest of political warfare.

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1. Das Kleine Blatt, Vienna, 28 November 1943 (News Digest #1286); Wiener Neuste Nachrichten, 16 November 1943 (News Digest #1304).
2. Völkischer Beobachter, Vienna, 14 November 1943, (News Digest #1298).
3. Letter by E.K. Winter, former Vice Mayor of Vienna, in New York Times, 4 November 1943. Cf. the reactions of Otto of Hapsburg, FNB Memo., B-130, 21 December 1943.
4. Oberdonauzeitung, Linz, 19 December 1943.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Moscow Declaration appeals to the opportunism of Austrians without arousing any special hope that the second Austrian Republic will be capable of solving its problems more successfully than the first. The mere promise of independence without any real guarantees for the future will not create a spirit of anti-German rebellion. The conditions placed upon independence can only puzzle Austrians who have had intimate contacts with the German terror. Without further elucidation and implementation it can hardly be expected to have serious effect upon active Austrian resistance to the Nazis.

V. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE RECEPTION BY AUSTRIANS OF THE MOSCOW DECLARATION

The intelligence available concerning the reaction of Austrians to the Moscow Declaration on Austria is inadequate to furnish a substantial picture, and therefore, at present, reliance must be made on the type of analysis presented above. Such as it is, however, it tends to confirm the argument presented above.

Little intelligence is available concerning the reaction of Austrians abroad except in the case of groups in Algiers, Great Britain, and the United States who have for the most part lost touch with the internal Austrian situation, and with each other. Representing as they do the earlier party groups of the Republic, they are still torn by the repercussions of party conflicts. For the most part, however, as victims of Nazism, and because the emigration is largely Jewish, they represent the moral indignation of Austrians as such, and the simple question of independence alone is of little interest to them except in this connection. It may be said therefore that they have welcomed the Declaration insofar as it promises release from Nazism, but that this welcome is tinged with reserve, concerning the promise and conditions of independence. The Monarchists, always a small and unorganized group in Austria, support the Declaration but are disappointed in that it does not specifically provide for a restoration.[1] Of Christian Social attitudes there is no available information. The Communists, in pursuit of a common national front, are hesitant about anything but a general confirmation because of uncertainty as to what Russian policy with respect to Austria will be. The Social Democrats are bound by their well established attitude: the powers must not bind Austria to independence. The

1. OSS., FNB. Memo. 17 November 1943.

Austrian people must, in accord with the principle of self-determination as contained in the Atlantic Charter, be given a chance to decide for themselves. This preference they hope would be for Anschluss with a democratic republican Germany.[1] The London Social Democrats take a more positive stand, however, for independence. But the responsible elements abroad do not presume to speak for Austrians at home.

The reactions of the Nazi press in Austria to the Declaration have been indicated in the previous section. The strength of this reaction against the decision for Austrian independence implies that it has made a certain impression. On the other hand, confidential sources state that there has been very little reaction in Austria,[2] and that a great many people outside Vienna and the urban centers have not even heard of the Declaration.[3] Later reports indicate that the limited number of Austrians who knew about the Declaration were either uncertain or apathetic. A "wait and see" attitude seems to prevail as a result, in part, of insufficient knowledge with respect to the actual progress of the war, and, in part, from what is apparently considered the inadequacy of the Declaration on the subject of political or economic federation with neighboring states. Reports from reputed Social Democratic circles indicate a hesitance to support independence wholeheartedly because of the possibility of an Anschluss with a post-war democratic Germany. Similarly, those individuals or sections of society which are described as clerical, and therefore are to be classified politically as Christian Socials, appear to welcome outside support for a break with Germany,

1. CID #51678, 29 December 1943.
2. State Department Cable, 28 December 1943.
3. SI Report TB-51, 17 December 1943.

but at the same time are reluctant to contemplate an independent existence involving a repetition of the experience of the republican days.[1] Information from Austrian prisoners of war indicates that few of them have heard of the Declaration, although some had heard of plans for setting up an independent Austria as these had been outlined by the BBC. None seemed at the moment of interrogation to have had positive convictions on the matter in hand; they were in general politically apathetic There is not much evidence of serious friction between Austrian soldiers and their German comrades in the Wehrmacht, and many of them, of course, are ardent Nazis who cannot contemplate the separation of Austria from Germany.

Thus it may be said, in conclusion, that from the available information, the Declaration has had no widespread or startling effects on the people within Austria. The reports of Swedish newspapers of popular demonstration for a Free Austria[2] remained unconfirmed, and are, if credible, certainly exaggerated. The Austrian does not see how, until the moment of collapse, he can be rid of the Nazis. His apathy with respect to independence is determined by a desire for a guarantee of more than mere independence. He hesitates to abandon Anschluss on the calculation that at another time and under different circumstances, Anschluss might be desirable. The constructive spirit for independence has, in fact, yet to be mobilized.

VI. THE DESIRABILITY OF A FREE AUSTRIAN COMMITTEE

Under these circumstances it is difficult to see the wisdom of further pushing the issue of independence upon the Austrians, at this moment, by the setting up of a Free Austrian Committee.

1. OSS. SI, 18 and 24 January 1944; OSS #26584, 1 January 1944. Stockholm Airgram, 31 December 1943.
2. FCC Ticker, 11 November 1943.

Of the types of Committee that might be set up there are three: 1. An entirely private organization without official or semi-official status, such as the Austrian Representative Committee in London (excluding Monarchists and Communists). Such a Committee is obviously without need of any outside intervention on the part of any governmental agency. 2. A semi-official Committee which, without exercising sovereignty, would have a definite status vis-à-vis (a) Austrian refugees and (b) the United Nations. (3) The official recognition of such a Committee as (2) would involve its acceptance as spokesman for the Austrians. It could be recognized as an official source for radio propaganda to the Austrians at home. Its representatives would be received by the Foreign Offices to be heard on all questions affecting Austria, such as the position of Austrian refugees, and the future of their homeland. Between 2 and 3, the official Austrian Committee, a number of median types can be conceived. An officially recognized Free Austrian Committee, exercising sovereignty for the moment, would have a government of its own (government-in-exile), or at least receive the status of a potential government.

Such a committee as 2 or 3 could probably be established only under the following conditions:

1. The Committee should be representative of the Austrian people both at home and abroad. The former major political parties, the Social Democrats, the Christian Socials, and the Communists would need to be represented. It would be desirable, moreover, to have representatives from the Free and Christian Trade Unions, and from the liberal groups, although the latter have not played and do not play any considerable rôle. The Monarchists, who have been and are a small group, would probably disrupt at the outset any such Committee. The

Communists are growing in strength in Austria, and their inclusion would help to avert having the Committee appear to be an instrument of the Allied Powers directed against Russia.

2. Such a Committee should be recognized by the three Great Powers. Non-recognition by Russia would make the Committee seem to be a tool of Allied warfare and would tend to stress differences among the Allies even where none exist. Recognition by Russia alone would be open to the same objection.

3. Such a Committee should promote United Nation's psychological warfare against the enemy by strengthening Austrian resistance at home, and undermining German strength.

4. The Committee's program should be in accord with the peace aims of the United Nations as expressed in the Atlantic Charter and the Moscow and Teheran conferences, viz., to help in the establishment of democratic nations in Europe.

One general consideration may well make the recognition of such a Committee inadvisable. The Declaration on Austria makes it clear that "in the final settlement [of the Austrian problem] account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation." The recognition of an official Austrian Committee at the present time would thus be incompatible with the text of the Declaration. Although Austria's independence has been decreed, her treatment as a future independent power, such as, for example, the permission to form a national government, is made conditional upon her contribution to the establishment of her independence. Austria has displayed little interest in the question of independence as such, and has so far been able to contribute very little to her liberation. She may never be able to do so. She may be put under United Nations' Military Government, and no national government may emerge or be allowed to emerge. To recognize an

official Committee would, under the circumstances, be like honoring a bill which may never fall due.

It is difficult to see, moreover, how the above conditions (1-4) could be readily fulfilled:

With respect to (1) it is not easy to provide, in any direct fashion, for a representation on the Committee of Austrians at home. Except in general terms, no information is available as to the precise nature of Austrian opinion. It cannot be determined, for example, whether such a Committee would be welcomed by Austrians at home. Granted that they could be brought out of Austria, it is not possible to determine who the leaders of the Austrian resistance movement are. The local Austrian scene has not yet crystallized. And while it may be presumed that representation of the major political parties may roughly correspond to prospective political organization in a future independent Austria, this is not certain, nor can it be assumed that leaders chosen from Austrians abroad would be known to, representative of, or acceptable to Austrians at home. While some of the exiled leaders of the Social Democrats, for example, may be considered representative, there do not appear to be available any generally accepted representatives of the Christian Socials among the exiles. It would also be difficult in such a Committee to prevent the resumption of old party conflicts which may have little interest for Austrians at home. There may be an earnest effort made by Communists, Socialists, Christian Socials, and Liberals to achieve a national union, but if the London Representative Committee (not to mention the German exile groups and other governments-in-exile) provides an example, such a union may not endure. Disagreement would be inevitable. The

diverging groups would be likely to turn to the Foreign Offices of the Great Powers for support and these would thus be drawn into their quarrels. The time might even come when the Great Powers would be compelled to repudiate a party or Committee as such. Such a step would defeat the very purpose for which such a Committee was originally set up, and prove a serious setback in psychological warfare.

With respect to (2) it is questionable whether the time is at hand when the international situation should be further complicated by the questions which a Free Austrian Committee would raise.

With respect to (3) it follows, from what has been said of the Moscow Declaration on Austria itself, that its implementation in this form would not necessarily be an effective instrument of psychological warfare. It could be made such only if it were used by the United Nations to remove or to soften the ambiguities and difficulties of that document. If, for example, such a Committee were able to implement economically, with a definite plan, the promised independence of Austria, its value as a weapon for psychological warfare would be considerably enhanced. A Committee as such would not solve the Austrian problem.

With respect to (4) it might be said that an official or semi-official Committee does not necessarily fit into the peace aims of the United Nations and may even endanger them. If the establishment of democratic nations in Europe depends upon realizing the will of the people, a Committee may be a means of thwarting that will. Remarks with reference to (1) are apropos here. A new leadership is likely to arise in Austria as elsewhere, unburdened by the historical mistakes

of its predecessors and trained in underground warfare. The existence of a Committee might bar or make more difficult the emergence of new leadership. Any Committee of exiles would probably affirm that it did not seek to assume power in Austria. Yet the existence of such a Committee would make resident Austrians suspicious that outside leaders might be imposed upon them. New parties may arise in the course of the war; new constellations may form, and it is by no means certain that a Committee would grant recognition to new movements even if it should be able to establish contact with them.

For the above reasons it appears inadvisable that an Austrian Committee be recognized at this time, either as the official or the semi-official spokesman for the Austrian nation. This does not mean that representatives of the chief parties and trade unions in exile should not be used in addressing propaganda to the Austrian nation on behalf of their organizations. More than upon the setting up of a Committee, psychological warfare against Austria depends for its success upon the victorious march of Allied arms, and upon convincing Austrians that their future independence in terms of economic and social security is worth struggling for.

VII. FUTURE AUSTRIAN POLITICS WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE

It is unlikely that the collapse of the Nazi regime will be precipitated by developments in Austria. It remains an open question whether, at the moment of collapse, in case the United Nations have not entered Austria, sufficient vigor will still be left in the underground organizations to set up a revolutionary government of their own. If such a government is formed it may be assumed that it will be leftist rather than rightist, i.e., Socialist or Communist, and as a bare possibility a

fusion of both. If such a national government is formed it is an open question whether the Allies will choose to recognize it and work with it or, rather, set up an Allied Military Government or a Military Government representative of the Allies in its stead. If such a government has not been formed it is to be assumed that agreement will have been reached among Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as to the character of the military occupation of Austria. In any case, with or without an Austrian Government, Allied Military Government will be confronted with the problem of developing in the minds and hearts of the Austrian people that will to live independently that has hitherto been so largely lacking.

The successful meeting of this responsibility will depend first of all upon the efficiency with which Military Government is able to handle the immediate problems of post-war Austria. These include the problems of food supply and war materials, the restoration of economic life and full employment, the resettlement of the Austrian population (civilians, soldiers, and foreign workers), the reestablishment of routes of communication and transportation, and the like, accompanied by the need to accomplish a thorough purge of Nazis and Nazi institutions. But in addition to providing a temporary solution of these problems, Military Government will need to lay the ground work for an Austrian belief that their problems can be solved on a long-range basis. This will involve providing a means for the cultivation of the closest relations with Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Yugo-Slavia and of course, in the last analysis, with Russia. The difficulties of this collaboration can, if the Austrian past is any clue, hardly be exaggerated. The penalties, moreover, imposed upon an independent Austria for war guilt, tempered as they will

be by Austria's contribution to her liberation, will have to be assessed with the greatest caution if the precarious Austrian mood is not to be driven into sullen hostility. Independence itself will be difficult enough to achieve without imposing preliminary handicaps.

It may be supposed that, in line with the previously announced policy, Military Government will reestablish civil liberties as soon as possible, and that therefore Austrian political life will be permitted immediately to revive, preparatory to the assumption by Austrians of the ultimate responsibility for independence. Under the circumstances it can be predicted that three parties, the Christian Socials, the Social Democrats, and the Communists will revive. At the same time it may be presumed that a small liberal, non-clerical, democratic party will be formed, and, possibly, outside of the Christian Socials, a small rightist party. It is not easy to predict other developments. Military Government will not, at least, permit the resurrection of Fascist or Fascist-cover parties. What then will be the attitude of these parties towards the future new Austria, granted that Military Government proves to be both benevolent and efficient? What chances are there, in other words, for Military Government to succeed where others have failed?

An encouraging answer can be given to this question only if the existence of a larger framework of international, Central European, or at least Danubian, political and economic security can be assured. In this case it might well be possible to wean the Social Democratic party from its desire for Anschluss, if, at the same time, it were guaranteed the opportunity to pursue its old and unachieved program for

Austria. It is likely that among the younger Revolutionary Socialists in Austria the insistence upon Anschluss is not so stubborn as in the older Social Democratic circles at home and abroad. It is quite possible that the guarantee of the simple democratic liberties in a future Austria far outweighs this old issue. The Nazi regime will have taken care of that. In the only underground program for the future that has come out of Austria, which in all likelihood stems from Social Democrats in Vienna, it is clear that, after the removal of Nazism, this Party looks forward to a resumption in an independent Austria of its Linz program of 1926. The Social Democrats may not proceed toward the realization of this program along old orthodox Marxist lines, but the program itself is thorough-goingly leftist. Without this guarantee for a better life within the narrow confines of Austria, the Social Democrats may be expected to seek for a solution within a larger framework, either that of a future leftist Germany or, by going Communist, entering the Russian orbit.

The Communist political appeal in post-war Austria will be assured by the prestige of its resistance movement among the Austrian people, the nature of its program, and the influence of the USSR as a post-war political force. The party program is fundamentally national, advocating an independent Austria operating within the framework of the United Nations. There is no public indication that the party will advocate a return to thetraditional Communist solution for internal problems. In its response to local disgust with a stubborn insistence upon old party shibboleths and methods, and to local demands for the simple restoration of democratic liberties and procedures, it will probably follow the Communist tactics in Germany, Italy, and Hungary, inviting rightist and

nationalistic support, and heralding a national policy with a program of democratic reform sufficiently indeterminate to attract the support of diversified groups. As in Germany, the Communist Party probably foresees a political force of nationalism in the post-war world, which takes its ideology and political orientation from the new nationalism of the USSR. The Free Austrian Movement abroad, like the Free German movement, is an effort to associate the Communist Party with this anticipated trend. The Austrian Party has supplied as yet no program for internal affairs, and it may be expected that no important section of the party will make any pronouncement on this score until its Central Committee in Moscow has spoken. While, in spite of their increased strength, it is not to be supposed that the Communists will overcome their original weakness sufficiently to offer any serious political competition to the Social Democrats, they are not bound by a traditional Anschluss policy. They may be expected to be willing to cooperate in the experiment of an independent Austria.

The forces which were once represented in the Christian Social party will, unlike the Socialists and Communists need more time for reorientation and reorganization. Without a separate party organization since 1934, they are handicapped by their association with Austro-Fascism from 1934-38. With the Anschluss that part of their leadership which did not turn Nazi found itself reduced to silence or to life in concentration camp or prison. The Church, which had given its support to Austro-Fascism was fearful of the losses it had sustained in Vienna to the Social Democrats, and in the provinces to the anti-clerical Nazis. It was now anxious to appear sympathetic

with the new popular enthusiasm, and hastened to endorse Hitler and his works in Austria. Only insighificant members of the Party went into exile. The Party has not had an organized underground movement to enhance its reputation. The little evidence available mentions Christian Socials, rather as individuals than as groups, cooperating with better organized Social Democratic and Communist cells. Some hints of an underground organization among Catholic Austrian journeymen are available. The Party, it may be assumed, has thus been thoroughly smashed. Yet it likewise is almost certain that the Nazi regime has won no large number of Christian Socials to its camp.

Although relatively silent after its post-Innitzer repentance, there is reason to believe that the Church, especially many of the parish clergy, recognizes not only the anti-Christian implications of National Socialism but resents the speedy way in which the Austrian Church has been reduced to the status of the German Church. Its organization may well form the nucleus for the revived Christian Social Party. Nor can it be assumed that the Austrian peasant, any more than the German peasant, has been converted to the methods of Nazi control. The Christian Socials are well schooled in the doctrine of adjusting oneself to any kind of political regime that permits one to live and thrive. The revived Christian Social Party may therefore be expected to support the experiment of an independent Austria, granted that the Church is restored to its former position in Austrian life. It will be the leading conservative party, and cannot be expected to have been thoroughly purged of its Fascist associations. It can be expected, however, that its small democratic left wing among the peasants and workers will be considerably expanded as a

result of the experience of the last ten years. But unlike the Communists it cannot be expected to revive with increased strength, and the greater importance of the Communists will make it the bulwark of amenable conservatism, even of reaction.

It is almost futile to try to predict the balance of power of these revived political parties. Something like the old balance between the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials is likely to survive. If it may be assumed that the minor rightist parties, absorbed into the Nazis, will have been discredited or prohibited, then the balance of power will remain with the Communists and liberal democratic middle class forces. It should not be impossible with this alignment to promote a functioning coalition national government. At least it can be supposed that the Social Democrats and the Christian Socials, after their experience between 1918 and 1938, will realize that the only other possible chance for the successful functioning of a democratic republic, will be the formation of an alliance between peasant and workers similar to that of the first two years of the First Republic. The common fate of the Free and Christian Trade Unions from 1934-38 may lead to a fusion of these organizations. The ensuing coalition of peasant Christian Socials and worker Social Democrats, based on a unified trade union movement, would augur well for the future political stability of the Second Republic. Yet without the economic framework referred to above, and without great encouragement, it would not be a coalition necessarily enthusiastic about independence. Indeed Military Government will, in the general absence of a long well-established national tradition, be confronted with a dilemma, the solution of which will be largely outside its particular province.

VIII. GENERAL CONCLUSION

At the moment the Hapsburg monarchy collapsed in 1918, there was no national Austrian sentiment upon which German Austria could be built. Austrian nationalism took the form of a desire for union with a democratic Germany. Austrian experience with independence from 1918 to 1938 kept any strong loyalty for an independent Austria from developing. The semi-Fascist form which that independence took from 1933 to 1938, was supported by only a small minority of convinced believers. Under the threat of absorption by Nazi Germany this minority expanded to a majority. But Hitler's forceful occupation of Austria was passively accepted and, except for the workers, acquired a certain amount of ardent support in the one year of peace and the early years of victory associated with that regime. With the turn of affairs, however, Austria found herself, not only the victim of German brutality and regimentation, but also the future subject of treatment by the United Nations as a defeated power. The desire to escape from this dilemma has promoted the mood for separation from Germany, not because the Austrians cherish their national independence, but because it offers their best opportunity to be free from Nazism, and to avoid penalties similar to those about to be meted out to Germany. The Nazis have by no means made full use of the Austrian propensity for Anschluss, and have even thwarted and disappointed it by their stern war measures; however, the hard treatment and disappointment have not been sufficient to evoke anything that could genuinely be called Austrian national sentiment. The terms of the Moscow Declaration are not calculated to transform this confused ambivalence of the Austrian into open resistance to the Nazis. It presents them with an independence of which they have unpleasant memories. It does

not guarantee that the new independence, after the Nazi purge, will be any better than the old. It threatens them with punishment for war guilt and warns that they must contribute to their liberation if generous treatment is to be expected. The strong shackles of German terror and controls make it unlikely that they can do much to contribute to their liberation. The character of their future treatment is thus uncertain, and the future stability of their independence a matter of suspicion and doubt. Under these circumstances it does not seem possible that at the moment a Free Austrian Committee can do much to change this mood, from perplexed searching-out of the future, to open resistance.

Considering, however, the Austrian experience with the Nazis, and with their own species of Fascism, the Military Governors have a better opportunity than ever before of developing a positive Austrianism. This can only be done by demonstrating that Austria's independence is something more than a method of punishing the Germans, or of fulfilling the larger plans of the Great Powers. It can be done, that is, by providing first of all some kind of guarantee of Austria's economic future, and then by promoting a democratic republic resting upon the cooperation of workers, peasants, and liberal middle class elements. Only thus can the foundations be built for a stable society within which, as elsewhere in Europe, national sentiment may grow. Yet no Austrian nationalism can be envisaged comparable to that of other European peoples. Without this stability, however, Austrians will, as before, prefer to cast in their lot with a non-Nazi Germany, or conceivably with Russia.

Appendix A: STATISTICS ON THE STRENGTH OF AUSTRIAN POLITICAL PARTIES FROM 1918 TO 1933

1. Reichsrat from 1911 to 1917:

	Christian Socials	Social Democrats
*Bohemia	1	23
*Bukovina	1	11
Lower Austria	25	11
*Gorz and Gradiska		8
*Krain		1
Upper Austria	18	25
Salzburg	4	1
*Silesia		3
Styria	12	4
Tyrol	12	2
*Trieste		22
Vorarlberg	3	
Total	76	91

*Not included in German Austria.

2. The composition of the National Constituent Assembly:

	Social Democrats	Christian Socials	German National
Vienna	32	11	3
Lower Austria without Vienna	15	16	6
Upper Austria	5	11	6
Salzburg	2	3	2
Styria	8	12	4
Carinthia	4	2	3
Tyrol	2	5	1
Vorarlberg	1	3	
Total	69	63	25

3. Occupational breakdown of membership of National Constituent Assembly:*

	Social Democrats	Christian Socials	German National
Agrarian		23**	9
Business and Industry	38***	8	5
Civil Service and Professional	34	38	12
Total	72	69	26

* The differences in totals between this table and the above is due to the addition of eight deputies from South Tyrol and three from Lower Styria.
** 1 laborer and 22 proprietors.
*** 27 workers.

4. Membership of the Landtage after elections held in 1919 subsequent to those for the National Constituent Assembly:

	Social Democrats	Christian Socials	Others
Vienna	44	19	5
Lower Austria without Vienna	20	26	6
Upper Austria	22	38	12
Salzburg	12	19	9
Styria	24	35	11
Tyrol	11	38	7
Vorarlberg	22	5	3

5. Comparative strength of the political parties in elections for Nationalrat:

1920	Social Democrats	Christian Socials	German National
Vienna	28	16	3
Lower Austria	12	20	5
Upper Austria	5	15	2
Salzburg	2	4	1
Styria	8	13	3
Carinthia	4	2	3
Tyrol	2	6	1
Total	61	76	18
Vorarlberg	1	3	
Transfer of votes from regional to national list	4	3	8
Total	66	82	26

1923	Social Democrats	Christian Socials	German National	Landbund
Vienna	24	15		
Lower Austria	13	19	1	
Upper Austria	5	13		1
Salzburg	1	3		
Styria	7	11		
Carinthia	4	2	2	2
Tyrol	1	6		
Vorarlberg		3		
Burgenland	3	3		1
Total	58	75	3	4
Transfer of votes from regional to national list	10	7	7	1
Total	68	82	10	5

1930	Social Democrats	Christian Socials	German National	Landbund and Heimwehr
Vienna	27	8		1
Lower Austria	13	17	1	
Upper Austria	5	10		
Salzburg	2	2		
Styria	8	7		4
Carinthia	4	2	1	2
Tyrol	1	4		
Vorarlberg	1	2		1
Burgenland	3	3		1
Total	64	55	2	9
Transfer of votes from regional to national list	8	11	5	11
Total	72	66	7	20

6. Party breakdown with respect to popular votes:

	1919	1927	1930
Social Democrats	1,211,814	1,539,635	1,517,251
Christian Socials	1,068,382	1,756,761	1,315,328
German Nationals	545,938	230,057	471,953
Heimwehr			227,402
Nazis		26,991	111,638
Communists		16,119	20,951

7. Returns from some provincial elections of 1932:

Vienna	1927	1932
Social Democrats	693,621	682,322
Christian Socials	423,615	233,622
German Nationals		8,858
National Socialists	7,248	201,365
Communists	7,521	20,309

Lower Austria	1930	1932
Social Democrats	291,167	276,274
Christian Socials	360,796	362,738
German National	70,172	18,390
Landbund		10,006
Nazis	34,307	110,774
Communists	4,122	8,480

Salzburg	1930	1932
Social Democrats	36,919	29,810
Christian Socials	51,239	44,013
German Nationals	15,625	2,050
Nazis	4,597	24,125
Communists	3,755	3,127

8. Comparative strength of Free and Christian Trade Unions:

	Free	Christian
1919	295,147	20,626
1921	1,079,777	78,737
1924	828,088	80,128
1927	772,702	78,906
1929	737,277	107,657
1930	655,204	111,939

9. Comparative strength of Free and Christian Unions in the provinces (1929):

	Free	Christian
Vienna	410,197	39,223
Lower Austria	134,029	17,229
Upper Austria	61,494	17,299
Salzburg	16,966	3,883
Styria	62,216	9,789
Carinthia	17,498	6,662
Tyrol	16,394	6,743
Vorarlberg	4,459	5,126
Burgenland	14,024	1,703
Total	737,277	107,657

10. Comparative strength of Christian Socials and Social Democrats in the Landtage in 1932 and 1933:

Burgenland: In the Burgenland Landtag of 1932 the Christian Socials and Heimwehr together controlled 14 out of 32 seats. The Social Democrats controlled 13.

Carinthia: In the Landtag of 1932 the Christian Socials controlled 3 out of 37 seats; the Social Democrats 15.

Lower Austria: In the Landtag of 1932 the Christian Socials controlled 33 out of 60 seats; the Social Democrats 21. In 1933 the Christian Socials had 28, the Social Democrats 20, and the Nazis 8 seats. Some of the CS seats went to the Nazis.

Upper Austria: In the Landtag of 1932, the Christian Socials had 28 seats out of 48; the Social Democrats 15.

Salzburg: In the Landtag of 1932, the Christian Socials had 12 out of 24 seats; the Social Democrats 9.

Styria: In the Landtag of 1932 the CS had 17 out of 48 seats; the Social Democrats 17.

Tyrol: In the Landtag of 1932 the CS (Tirold Volkspartei) had 26 out of 40 seats; the Social Democrats 9.

Vorarlberg: In the Landtag of 1932 the CS had 21 out of 30; the SD 6. In 1933 the CS dropped to 18 out of 26 and the Nazis gained 2.

Vienna: The City Council in 1933 had 62 Social Democrats, 15 Christian Socials, and 10 Nazis.

Appendix B: BIOGRAPHICAL LIST OF EXILE AND RESIDENT AUSTRIANS

Names with a double asterisk (**) may be considered the most prominent Austrians at home or abroad; with a single asterisk (*) the more prominent.

I. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Outside of Axis Domination:

**Adler, Friedrich, W., born 1879, editor of the principal Socialist organ "Arbeiter-Zeitung" until 1916; assassinated Count Stuergkh, Austrian Prime Minister, 1916; sentenced to death 1917, later reprieved to 18 years' imprisonment; freed 1918; member of parliament 1919 to 1923; Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Party; Secretary of the Labor and Socialist International 1924-1940. Left Austria in 1925. Editor-in-chief and publisher of "Der Kampf," 1920 to 1934. Son of Doctor Victor Adler, one of the founders and leaders of the Social Democratic Party during Austrian Monarchy, Friedrich Adler is one of the leading personalities of the Social Democratic Party, and his ideas influenced, together with the ideas of Otto Bauer, the policies of the party even after he had left Austria and resided in Zurich and Brussels. Came to U. S. in 1940; at present chairman of Austrian Labor Committee in New York. He is reported to be critical of Moscow statement on Austria and for Austria's right to self-determination (OSS, FNB No. B 132, 30 December 1943).

*Allina, Heinrich, born around 1877; member of parliament until 1934; trade-union leader, especially of banking institution employees; now in London, where he split off from the Social Democratic party in order to join hands with other Austrian groups, but is reported to have asked for readmission to the party. (OSS Biographical Record Section No. 1975)

Braunthal, Julius, born 5 May 1891, Aide to Austrian War Minister with rank of Lt. Colonel, 1919-20; publicist and editor-in-chief of "Das Kleine Blatt, Bunte Woche, co-editor Der Kampf; exiled in 1934, went to Czechoslovakia where he organized in 1935 a lecture campaign in Sudetenland for the Social Democratic Party together with Julius Taub. At present in London.

*Breitner, Hugo, born in the early 1870's; former vice-president of private banking institution, later city treasurer of Vienna and one of the leading figures of the city administration until 1932. Financed Vienna's public housing program; member of upper chamber of Austrian Parliament 1901-1934. Now in Claremont, California.

Czernetz, Carl, born 1907; up to 1934 active only in Socialist Student's Movement, later worked secretly for the party; belonged to Revolutionary Socialists; now member of the Austrian Representative committee in London. (OSS, BGR No. 2011)

**Deutsch, Julius, born 1884 in Lackenback (Burgenland); writer, secretary of the Socialist Party; Under-Secretary of State for Military Affairs, 1918; Secretary of State for Military Affairs, 1919-20; since 1920 Parliamentary Commissioner for Military Affairs; member of the Constituent National Assembly, 1919-20; member of the Nationalrat, 1920-1934. Educated Vienna, Zurich, Berlin, Paris, Artillery Officer 1914-18; chief of Socialist Militia Republikanischer Schutzbund 1923-34; president Socialist Sport International, 1927; deprived of Austrian citizenship, 1934. Military leader of Socialists in February 1934; emigrated to Czechoslovakia, was later promoted to General by Loyalists in Spanish Civil War; now member of Austrian Labor Committee, New York, and on staff of OWI.

*Novy, Franz, born around 1897, construction worker; secretary of Construction Workers Union, 1928; member of Vienna City Council 1932-34. Emigrated in 1934 to Czechoslovakia; left in 1938 for Stockholm, Sweden, where he was until 1942, then went to London, England; is now chairman of Austrian Representative Committee in London. Did not play leading part within party while in Austria, and was known mostly in his own Construction Workers Union; is considered a good trade union organizer and expert in his own professional concerns. He is described as quiet, fearless, reliable, and efficient in spite of somewhat limited education. He is reported as a simple, modest personality (OSS BRS No. 2009 of 29 December 1943). He was delegated to represent Austrian Underground Union Movement abroad, and seems to have been successful in maintaining some kind of contact with underground trade unions.

*Pollack, Oscar, born 1893, educated Vienna University; assistant Secretary of Labor and Socialist International 1923 to 1926, interpreter at various International Congresses, foreign editor Arbeiter-Zeitung and joint editor Der Kampf, editor-in-chief Arbeiter-Zeitung since 1932. Stayed in Vienna 1934-38, and worked secretly for Revolutionary Socialists; left Austria in 1938 for Paris, where he continued to work for Der Kampf; later went to London, where he became member of the London Committee of the Austrian Socialists; at present he is secretary of the Austrian Representative Committee in London. He is described as an excellent newspaper man and as very intelligent. He is also reported to be known in Austria mainly among party circles and has never run for office. He is reported as being rather a typical intellectual than a well-known labor leader. (OSS BRS No. 2008, 30 December 1943)

Richter, Gustav, in his sixties; active in Carinthia, later during 1934-38 leader of the Revolutionary Socialists in their underground activities; at present in New York, married to an American Quaker; not a member of the Austrian Labor Committee. Richter is probably the most important socialist abroad but refuses to participate in refugee politics; it is reportedly his belief that leadership of the Austrian Socialists must come from the present underground.

Sailer, Karl Hans, born around 1900, former editor on the staff of the Arbeiter-Zeitung; chief defendant in the trial against socialist underground workers in March 1936; leader of the Revolutionary Socialists; leading member of the illegal party steering board (Central Committee); now in the Middle East, allegedly in British service.

Strasser, Ferdinand, factory worker from Upper Austria, later employed by Workers Health Insurance Company; member of the Upper Austrian diet until 1934; leader of Socialist militia, Republikanischer Schutzbund; tending to extreme left wing. Left for Russia after 1934 revolt, but returned after one year. About sixty years old, now a member of the Austrian Representative Council in London. (OSS BRS No. 2012, 29 December 1943)

Svitanicz, Johann, employed by the youth organization of the trade unions; official of central committee of trade unions, delegate to the International Labor conference in Geneva. Emigrated to Prague after 1934; in London secretary to the Austrian Trade Union Committee and now a member of the Austrian Representative Committee in London. (OSS BRS No. 2011, 29 December 1943)

Weigl, Karl, born 1879, 1919-1931 member of the central board of the federation of trade unions; member of the city council of Vienna until 1932; now in Stockholm.

Inside Austria: This information is of necessity incomplete and generally covers only the years up to 1938.

Eifler, Alexander, born about 1888, major in Austrian army, career officer, then chief of staff of Schutzbund, party member since 1919; was 1939 in concentration camp at Dachau, probably still there. (OSS BRS No. 1610, 17 November 1943)

Hellmer, Oskar, about 55 years old, former typesetter; elected to diet of Lower Austria in 1919; belonged to the right wing of the party; later Lieutenant Governor of Lower Austria, popular in southern part of Lower Austria; whereabouts unknown. (OSS BRS No. 514, 13 August 1943)

Koerner, Theodor, born 1874, graduated from military school, Military Academy and War College; career of Austrian Staff Officer; was chief of staff (during World War I) to General Alfred Krauss (in Serbia) and to General Wurn (in Italy), then 1918 to 1920 executive officer to Secretary of War, Julius Deutsch (see above). Retired in 1925 and became member of the Party, was member of the Upper Chamber of the Austrian parliament until 1934. Many decorations; is described as very intelligent and highly cultured; whereabouts unknown. (OSS, BRS No. 770, 27 August 1943)

Proft, Gabriele, born about 1879, became secretary to Party Secretary of the Social Democratic Party, 1911; was elected in 1919 to the Austrian parliament, to which she belonged until 1934, is described as leading member of local and state Social Democratic Women's Organization and of the S.D. Steering Committee. Described as very industrious, intelligent, and

a good speaker. (OSS BRS No. 679, 21 August 1943). Is known as a leading personality among the underground organizations until 1938, and is reported to have carried on underground work since. Whereabouts unknown.

Ofenboeck, Anton, born about 1875, former mayor of Wiener-Neustadt; started as printer, later editor of S.D. Weekly; since early youth member of the S.D. party; member of diet for Lower Austria, member of upper chamber of parliament until 1934. Whereabouts unknown. (OSS BRS No. 885, 7 September 1943)

Schaeff, Adolf, born about 1893, civil service; librarian of parliament, 1919, secretary to Club of S.D. members of parliament; later member of Upper chamber of parliament until 1934, then retired. Whereabouts unknown.

Schneidmadl, Heinrich, born around 1892, grew up in St. Poelten section of Lower Austria; elected to the diet of Lower Austria after 1919; member of Lower Austrian state government; described as excellent speaker. Whereabouts unknown. (OSS BRS No. 680, 21 August 1943)

**Seitz, Carl, (Socialist), born 1869 in Vienna, school teacher; 1902, member of the diet of Lower Austria; since 1901 member of the Austrian Reichsrat; 1918, Deputy President of that body; 1918-19 member of the Provisional National Assembly, President of that legislative body and member of the Nationalrat; 1919-20 President of the Nationalrat and entrusted with the functions of President of the Austrian Republic; since 1923 burgomaster and local governor of Vienna; chairman of the Socialist Party Executive; Chairman of the Parliamentary Socialist Party. A tailor, attended Teacher's Seminary until 1888, graduated, and became member of the board of education,

1897; as young man became chairman of the Central Association of Viennese Teachers, and, together with Victor Adler, was chairman of the Social Democratic Party in Austria. He played a leading role in parliament as a speaker, remained in Vienna after 1934, is described as a popular figure in Vienna and as having immense influence with the people. He is also described as "the best-loved man in Vienna." (OSS BRS No. 678, 21 August 1943) Imprisoned in 1934, then transferred to a sanatorium; released December 1934.

Sichlader, Franz, born around 1893, former mayor of Steyr in Upper Austria; welder in armament factory; early member of S.D. party and trade union; head of local of metal workers union in Steyr; member of city council of Steyr and of diet of Upper Austria; retired after 1934. (OSS BRS No. 973, 17 September 1943) Whereabouts unknown.

II. COMMUNIST PARTY

Outside of Axis domination:

*Fischer, Ernst, born around 1899 in Graz, Styria; attended university without finishing his studies; became writer and reporter, all positions with socialist newspapers; joined S.D. party very early, belonged to its left wing. After revolt in 1934 went to Russia and joined Communist Party. Is described as gifted writer, at present in Moscow. (OSS BRS No. 1974, 22 December 1943)

Fritz, Walter, alias Brichocek, Otto, chairman of "monarchistic-communist" Austrian World Movement in London. Reports describe him as "Moscow-trained" and delegated to enter the movement. (OSS, FNB)

Koestler, Marie, former member of the Austrian parliament as member of S.D. Party; former head of welfare work in Styria;

at present chairman of the League of Austrian Socialists in London, which is described as being under strong communist influence.

*Koplenig, Johann, shoemaker by profession, former chairman of the Communist party in Austria, elected to that office 1927. Went at an early date to Russia and directed all activities from there after the suppression of the Communist party in Austria 1933.

III. CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PARTY

Outside of Axis domination:

Bosch, F. X., presently in London, where he organized the council of Austrians in Great Britain, later member of executive committee of the Association of Austrian Christian Socials, little is known here about his past. Is reported to have been editor of Sturm uber Oesterreich, organ of pro-Schuschnigg Catholic militia.

*Dobretsberger, Josef, born 1903, lecturer University of Vienna, professor of economics, Graz University; practising Catholic, minister for Social Welfare 1935-36; left wing Ch. S. party; opposed to Heimwehr; emigrated 1938; professor in Ankara; supposed to be in Cairo. (OSS BRS No. 1505, 15 November 1943)

Goessinger, not known by Austrians here, active in London and mentioned in connection with the recent Representative Committee there.

Herzfeld, formerly owned a dry goods store in Vienna and was an official of the Tennis Association. Politically without influence and inactive in Austria. In London.

Schneider, Franz, in London, (see Goessinger) attorney from Lower Austria, little else is known about him.

Strachwitz, Curt, Count, pro-Schuschnigg journalist; former editor of the Vienna evening daily Der Telegraph, now in London,

(see Goessinger).

Thaler, Andreas, born 1883 in the Tyrol, farmer, minister for agriculture 1926-1929, member of diet of Tyrol 1924-1933; toured South America 1928 and emigrated there 1933 as founder of an Austrian agricultural colony.

*Winter, Ernst Karl, one time Christian-Social, intellectual, free lance writer, editor and publisher of Wiener Politische Blaetter, appearing irregularly, appointed deputy mayor for Vienna 1934 to appease labor; failed. Since 1938 at New School for Social Research in New York; founded now defunct "Austrian Center," a political left-center group in New York.

Messner, Johannes, former Vienna university professor of theology; one of the protagonists of the corporative state as outlined in "Quadragesimo anno." Now living in California.

Inside Austria:

Buchinger, Rudolf, agrarian; former minister of agriculture in various cabinets. Whereabouts unknown.

*Ender, Otto, born 1875; local governor of Vorarlberg province since 1918; former chancellor and author of the constitution of 1934. Later president of the General Accounting Office, former member of upper chamber Austrian parliament; at present in concentration camp at Dachau.

Kienboeck, Victor, born 1873, former member city council of Vienna since 1918, several times finance minister, member of parliament Ch. S. party until 1932, later member state council (1934-1938). President Austrian National Bank until 1938. Whereabouts unknown.

Kollmann, Josef, born 1868, mayor of the city of Baden, member of parliament 1919-1933; left wing Ch. S. party, former minister of finances. Whereabouts unknown.

**Kunschak, Leopold, born 1871, former leading member of Ch. S. party, member parliament since 1907 and Vienna city council since 1904, member Lower Austria diet since 1908, later member state council 1934-1938. Founder of Ch. S. workers unions in Vienna 1892, founded and edited first labor newspaper (Ch. S.) Die Freiheit. Whereabouts unknown.

Lugmayer, Karl, born 1892, practising Catholic, trade unionist, editor of Christian-Social union publication "Neue Ordnung"; later head of Vienna school system and adult education boards; considered left wing of Ch. S. party; described as intelligent and conscientious worker. (OSS BRS No. 427, 5 August 1943) Whereabouts unknown.

Mataja, Heinrich, born 1877, lawyer, 1910 member Vienna city council, 1913-1930 member parliament, 1924-26 minister for foreign affairs. Whereabouts unknown.

*Miklas, Wilhelm, born 1872, former high school teacher; practising Catholic; retired from civil service 1924, was member of Lower Austrian school board, member parliament 1907-1928, 1923-1928 speaker of Nationalrat; was elected 1928 Federal president (head of state) until 1938. Secretary of state for education 1919-1920, considered to be left wing of Ch. S. party (OSS BRS No. 821, 2 September 1943) Cast only vote against Anschluss in Austrian parliament 1919. Whereabouts unknown.

Ramek, Rudolf, born 1881, member parliament 1919-1933, secretary of state for justice 1919-1920, chancellor 1924-26; lawyer in Salzburg; whereabouts unknown.

Rehrl, Franz, born 1890, local governor Salzburg province, 1920-1938, member Salzburg diet 1918, member upper chamber parliament 1920-38; reported to have been arrested by the Nazis; whereabouts unknown.

Resch, Josef, born 1880, studied law, joined staff of Workers Accident Insurance Institute in Vienna; member of parliament 1919-1923, later became minister for Social Welfare, is a workers insurance specialist, considered left wing Ch. S. party. Whereabouts unknown.

Schlegel, Josef, born 1869, studied law and entered judicial service 1893; member parliament 1901-1918; member diet Upper Austria 1902-1934; connected with provincial government Upper Austria 1919-1934. Whereabouts unknown.

Stepan, Karl, born around 1893, former governor of Styria, member of publishing house in Graz, secretary of Ch. S. party in Graz, 1934 secretary general Vaterlaendische Front; at present in concentration camp at Dachau. (OSS BRS No. 207, 8 July 1943)

Strobl, Ludwig, left wing member of Ch. S. party; former minister of agriculture, leader in agricultural cooperative movement; it is believed that he is at present cooperating with the Nazis. Whereabouts unknown.

*Stumpf, Franz, born 1876, professor of mathematics; 1907-1920, member of parliament; 1920-1934, governor of Tyrol and member of upper chamber of parliament. Whereabouts unknown.

Vaugoin, Karl, born 1873, career officer until became member of city council, Vienna 1918, member parliament 1920-34, member state council 1934-38; minister for military affairs 1922-1933; retired from politics in 1933, became president Federal Railways; probably still in Dachau concentration camp.

IV. OTHER PERSONALITIES

Outside Axis domination:

Czernin, Count Ferdinand, about 39, no political past, although known in Austrian society. Founded Austrian Action in New York

with some Czech support. Claims to be a liberal.

*Kelsen, Hans, born 1881, the author of Austria's democratic Constitution (1920). Was professor at the University of Vienna and published a number of important works in the field of Political Science. Lives in America. Was attached to the Department of Political Science of the University of California at Berkeley (Cal.).

Retchek, Anton, born 1885. Austrian minister to Brazil. Recently recognized again by Brazilian government as Austrian minister. Career diplomat. Conservative.

Rott, Hans, former official of the Christian Post Office employees trade union, later member of Schuschnigg cabinet and at present only member of last Austrian government outside of Austria. Now in New York and head of various Free Austria movements (monarchists). Is reported to be extremely close to Otto of Hapsburg.

Schueller, Richard, born 1870, former high civil service official, professor at Vienna university; former minister of commerce, then specialist in foreign commerce negotiations; considered conservative; at present with New School for Social Research in New York. Negotiated Rome Protocols. Member of the defunct military committee.

A number of other individuals have been associated with Austrian activities and while known in some American or English circles, are quite unknown to the great majority of the Austrian people. These include:

Busckbeck, Erhardt
Franckenstein, Sir George
Fuchs, Martin
Haberler, Gottfried
Hecht, Otto
Hertz, Friedrich
Hula, Erich
Hutter, Helmut
Klein, Franz
Muller-Sturheim, E.
Mises, Ludwig von
Morgenstern, Oscar
Ranshofen-Wertheimer, Egan